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"We wish to proceed here by beginning anew...."1 
1. The Practice of Transcendental Phenomenology 
The purpose of this paper is to show how, contrary to some 
commentators, Edmund Husserl's notion of the epoche, the bracketing or 
suspension of "naive" consciousness in favor of the phcnomenologically 
"reduced" point of view, is an indispensable aspect of the practice of the 
phenomenological method.2 But the epoche is not merely an instrumental 
means. While it does function as a means, it is not merely an instrumental 
means because the epoche is simultaneously itself the end toward which it 
is a means, viz, the realization of apodictic knowledge as a lived process 
rather than a final solution. To treat Husserl's phenomenological 
reduction as merely an instrumental method for grasping and presenting 
the absolute essence of this or that truth would be already to have missed 
the subtler dimensions of both method and truth in Husserl's 
transcendental phenomenology. 
In order to adequately describe what the epoche "is," in accordance 
with the principle of presuppositionlcssness established by the epoche, it 
would be necessary already to have achieved the phenomenological 
perspective to which the epoche leads. The epoche cannot properly be 
grasped from the perspective of what Husscrl calls the "naive" or "natural 
attitude" because it is precisely this kind of common-sense positivism that 
the epoche was designed to overcome. This "overcoming" is not merely an 
epistemological problem of "perspective," of getting the "right" 
interpretative slant on the epoche, but a problem of the fundamental 
difference between the unreflective, objectivistic orientation of the natural 
attitude, and the absolute freedom from bias that is to be achieved by 
virtue of the transcendental reduction. Therefore, to make the epoche 
itself an "object" of investigation placed "over and against" the 
investigating consciousness, as a possibility of being grasped and 
1 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1970), III A, Sect. 43, p. 154; hereafter 'C. 
2 H. Spiegelberg, e.g., claims that the epoche is "not indispensable" and can 
even become "hazardous and ...falsify the approach to the phenomena...." 
The Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984; 
3rd cd.), pp. 710-11. 
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described as it really is, is to remain ensnared in exactly those sedimentary 
presuppositions which, according to Husserl, render philosophical 
apodicticity impossible. 
There is precedent for our disclaimer here. From Ideas I on, Husserl 
himself relentlessly confronts his own slipping back into the natural 
attitude after the epochc has been performed, criticizing, for instance, his 
use of spatial metaphors to describe various aspects of the transcendental 
sphere, terms such as "above," "stratum," and "component." These 
metaphors, Husserl says, "taken from the sphere of the natural world . . . 
arc dangerous" and, if they arc to be used, a "necessary transformation of 
their sense must be noticed" (C, 111 A, 51, p. 174). This transformation of 
sense is the linguistic equivalent of the transformation of consciousness 
brought about by the epoche itself. Language thus becomes a 
"transcendental problem" or "region" whose true nature will only be 
uncovered through further transcendental analyses (C, III A, 55, p. 188). 
We will return to this important question of language in Section 4 below, in 
the context of Husserl's essay 'The Origin of Geometry" and The Crisis. 
The epoche is not merely a device or technique that can be used to 
"adequately" excavate self-evident truth. The epoche is not a tool. The 
only "tool" of transcendental phenomenology is the experience of the 
phenomenological investigator himself or herself. The only "technique" 
employed is an actual self -transformation, the achievement of a new, 
reflective "naivete," a fundamental change-of-attitude that is a lived 
posture of the investigating consciousness (C, III A, 40, p. 150). In short, 
one cannot fully understand the epoche without first undertaking it. 
2. Incipient Forms of the Epoche in Husserl's Early Work 
It is possible to trace the history of Husserl's development of the 
epoche from its emergence in his early works where it first appears, 
according to our argument, in seminal form, to its maturity in The Crisis. 
In his Logical Investigations (1900), Husserl discusses the essential 
principle of his phenomenological investigation of the ground of universal 
knowledge as a certain "thinking over" which is a "freedom from 
presuppositions" (LI, II, 7, pp. 263-64).3 Husserl amplifies this principle of 
presuppositionlessncss by saying that it is more of a "shedding of light" 
than factual explanation: "Its aim is not to explain knowledge in the 
psychological or psychophysical sense as a factual occurrence in objective 
nature, but to shed light on the Idea of knowledge in its constitutive 
elements and laws" (LI, II, 7, p. 265). Once the constitutive dimension of 
the "mind" is recognized, "adequate" or "fulfilled" knowledge can no 
longer be deduced from principles or objects which somehow exist "in-
3Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, 2 vols., trans. J.N. Findlay (Halle, 
1900; New York: Humanities Press, 1970); hereafter 'LI'. 
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themselves," independent of the mind in the Kantian sense. A new 
"freedom" is now required in order to detach the phenomenological 
consciousness from the "prejudice" of objectivity and the unquestioned 
bias of naive empiricism. 
This theme is reiterated in "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" (1911) in 
terms of freedom from "historicism," the bias which assumes that history 
can be made into an "object" to be grasped independently of the historical 
subject who is always already involved in that process, always already 
immersed in the ongoingness of history.4 Insofar as the subjective self-
consciousness is itself historical ("historicity"), the objectification of the 
historical ("historicism") will always fail to arrive at the true, or fully "valid" 
essence of any historical "ob-ject." Rather, what is needed, Husserl asserts, 
is an "entering vitally into an historically reconstructed spiritual formation" 
through "philosophical intuition" and "the phenomenological grasp of 
essences" (PRS, p. 128, 147). But this is not merely a methodological or 
theoretical problem. It is rather a response to a "spiritual need" which 
"afflicts us, a need that leaves no point of our lives untouched" (PRS p. 140). 
In order to overcome these difficulties which are virtually ignored by 
empiricism, naturalism, and historicism, a radically new "science" is 
needed. Far from avoiding the historical content of the philosophical 
tradition, this radically new procedure must "penetrate the soul" of the 
tradition's words and theories. 
History, as with language, thus becomes a "region" of 
phenomenological analysis for Husserl. The meaning of history demands 
an intentional analysis itself, an analysis of the essence of history (its 
"fundamental structures") as the constituted correlate (what will become 
the 'noema') of historical self-consciousness. History is not simply "there" 
for us, like a rock is "there" for empirical science. Rather, we make history. 
Thus, no particular answers to historical problems, the positional truths of 
"VJeltanschauugen," the "particular" sciences, can ever be final, apodictic 
answers. A universal, "scientific" philosophy is needed, Husserl argues, 
which "for the sake of time" does not "sacrifice eternity" (PRS, p. 141). 
It is exactly through the epoche that, Husserl believes, this "scientific 
clarity" can be achieved. Like history itself, however, the epoche cannot 
be grasped as a scientific "object." It is a process of self-transformation, 
"rising from below" (PRS, p. 147) Husserl says, a "living" methodology 
which is non-conceptualizable as such. One cannot merely think one's way 
through the "universal" epoche. The epoche, as a continual approach to 
the origin of its own being, is always a doing again, always a beginning 
anew. "Philosophy," Husserl says, "is essentially a science of true 
beginning" (PRS, p. 146). Perhaps that is why Husserl himself returned to 
Edmund Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology 
and the Crises of Philosophy, trans. Qucntin Laure (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1965); hereafter, 'PRS'. 
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the epoche again and again; not because of any inherent defect or failure 
of earlier attempts to formulate it, or because he did not yet have the 
procedure worked out "right," but because this "beginning again," as 
Merleau-Ponty also realized, is itself the essence of philosophy. Perhaps, 
also, that is why Husserl's Ideas, Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis are 
all subtitled "Introductions" to phenomenological philosophy. Had 
Husscrl lived longer, one wonders how many more "Introductions" there 
might have been. 
3. The "Cartesian" Reduction 
Concerning the "Cartesian" reduction, it will be helpful to keep in 
mind from the outset Husserl's own later assessment of this earlier 
approach. In The Crisis, Husserl criticizes the "Cartesian" approach to the 
reduction as having "a great shortcoming" in that it prematurely achieves 
the transcendental "in one leap," and consequently finds itself involved 
with a transcendental "ego" that is "empty of content" — merely the bare 
universal which has not yet been fully explicated (C, III A, 43, p. 155). This 
is the epoche we discover in Ideas I.5 What is helpful about it is that it 
brings to light for the first time in Husserl's' work, the fundamental 
technical problems of transcendental phenomenology, problems that will 
be carried over, re-thought, and expanded in The Crisis. The "Cartesian" 
reduction, however, lacks a resolution for the "how" of intersubjective 
world-constitution, as well as recognition of the essentially personal and 
communal dimensions of the later formulations of the transcendental 
which will be described below. 
Husserl's groundwork for the phenomenological reduction in Ideas I, 
if not the actual undertaking of it, is laid out in a series of stages in the first 
four chapters of the text. This development has a rather sudden and 
unexpected culmination at the end of Section 46 where Husserl declares 
without reservation that his inquiry has already "reached its climax" insofar 
as he has now achieved that peculiar kind of knowledge which is the 
foundation of the reduction and which, consequently, will allow for "the 
detachability in principle of the whole natural world from the domain of 
consciousness...." This knowledge is the work of "the region of pure 
consciousness" in the ego's immanent reflection upon (intentional) 
experience (Erlebnis) {Ideas, 1, 46, pp. 131-32). (It should be noted that in 
The Crisis, 'experience' is referred to primarily and consistently as 
Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, 
vol. I, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (1913; New York: Colier Books, 1962); 
hereafter, Ideas. 
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"Erfahrung," whereas in Ideas I both Erlebnis and Erfahrung are used, 
sometimes interchangeably.)6 
Husserl is well aware of the fact that the establishment of this region 
of pure consciousness (and hence the very possibility of the reduction) is 
wholly dependent upon the fundamental distinction between the 
experience (Erfahrung) of things or objects that are "transcendent," and 
the essentially different type of reality which is experience (Erlebnis ) given 
through immanent reflection. The former (Erfahrungen), although 
predelineated in a manner which is apparently complete, are necessarily 
perspectival, spatial, always inadequate to their objects and, at best, are 
only able to be adumbrated or sketched out in a partial and contingent 
way. The latter (Erlebnisse), however, are not spatial objects, not 
"presented" at all. They have no sides as such. They can be perceived 
"immanently" and only immanently and are "given," therefore, according 
to Husserl, indubitably and absolutely. 
Now even though a mental process, that is, an inner experience, is 
given absolutely in its "presentation," nevertheless, "in respect to its 
essence" it is a part of the whole stream of mental life and consequently 
can never be grasped in "its full unity" or completeness. But this 
"incompleteness" of the essence of an experience in regard to the whole 
stream of experiences is essentially different, Husserl contends here, from 
the incompleteness of the experience of a physical thing, which is always 
transcendent and is restricted, therefore, not only in terms of possible 
future perceptions, but also in terms of the perspectival limitations of the 
sensual perception of the thing within any given perceptual "now." There 
is some similarity between these incompletenesses, Husserl allows, but a 
radical, essential difference in their transcendent and immanent potential 
to be grasped. In any "now" of any immediate, given experience, there is a 
full, adequate and absolute apprehension of the essence of that "now". 
Not so with transcendent, spatial objects. 
It is not merely the immediate, marginal background, Husserl tells us, 
that is a part of the perceptual field of the thing, but beyond this (we learn 
from reflective consciousness), there are other fields in which other objects 
could also arise in connection with the present perceptual field, 
continuously and harmoniously, in terms of what is meaningfully possible; 
all joined together in "concatenations" to form my "noticeable field" which, 
in turn, gives rise to the particular object that is there at this moment "for 
me." In other words, the immediate background of the object does not 
constitute the whole field of the object perceived because this background 
or any part of it could, at any moment, become the object of another field, 
and so on, throughout the whole realm of possible universes. 
Erazim Kohak, Idea and Experience: Edmund Husserl's Project of 
Phenomenology in 'Ideas I', (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 
pp. 156-58. 
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The existence of other perceiving subjects docs not alter this situation 
for Husserl, since, as transcendent objects themselves (for me), other 
perceiving subjects would merely be included in my perceptual world and 
I in theirs by virtue of being connected through the harmonious 
motivational concatenations which give rise to my current sphere of 
perception in the first place. Just as all possible "worlds" would be 
included in any given perceptual sketch — grounded in harmony with my 
present sphere — so too all possible perceiving subjects. This initial 
handling of intersubjectivity, subject to the charge of idealistic solipsism, 
will be developed by Husserl into an understanding of the transcendental 
ego as a "community of monads" in Cartesian Meditations, and, 
furthermore, as will be shown below, will be brought to an even more 
passionate, personal, and far-reaching realization in The Crises. Here, as 
we will see below, the philosopher will be called upon to be the self-
reflection of mankind. 
In the final analysis, the Cartesian epoche, along with the 
"constitutive" dimension of consciousness (the noesis/nocma structure) 
which would require a separate discussion itself, establishes for Husserl 
"an absolute sphere of materials and noetic forms" which can be grasped 
and described in their purity by the phenomenologist as the real truth of 
the perceptual process, an "ultimate source" that Husserl believes offers 
"the only conceivable solution of the deepest problems of knowledge." 
The intentional analysis of the real components of perception would 
provide, if Husserl is correct, "objectively valid knowledge" {Ideas, 1, 97, p. 
263). In other words, given the claim of the phenomenological reduction to 
secure an absolute vantage point, together with the claim of the 
constitutive nature of intentionality, the world of transcendent objects "out 
there" is now understood to be wholly phenomenal or "irreal," and the 
underlying truth or real (reelle) process of perception can now be grasped 
through intentional analysis and 'pure' phenomenological description. 
4. The Reduction from the Lived World 
In contrast with the Cartesian variation of the epoche, the 
phenomenological reduction as Husserl works it out in The Crisis has more 
of a practical (ethical) and "spiritual" orientation than the more 
"scientifically rigorous" renderings of Ideas I and Cartesian Meditations. 
Those early probings into the "new region" achieved through the 
reduction, in our view, are propaedeutic to what appears in its maturity in 
The Crisis. It is true, to a certain extent, that the reduction is one and the 
same throughout. But this "sameness" does not diminish the important 
differences that separate the "earlier" from the "later" Husserl. Husserl's 
thinking itself must be understood as "a constant becoming through a 
constant intentionality of development" (C, Appdx IV, p. 338). 
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Husserl reveals this shift of attitude regarding the epoche in the 
connection between language and thought as this is expressed in "The 
Origin of Geometry/' an essay from about the same period as The Crisis.7 
Husserl's theory of linguistic signification put forward in this late text views 
language as a "linguistic living body \Sprachleib)," a "linguistic 
embodiment" (OC, p. 161) of originative meaning which can be repeatedly 
re-lived and thus continued by others (OC, p. 164). A similar appreciation 
of language can be found in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of 
Perception, especially the chapter entitled 'The Body as Expression, and 
Speech." 8 The problem here is that there is a "seduction of language," a 
tendency of words and concepts to become scdimcntcd "in the form of 
persisting linguistic acquisitions," so that the "self-evident structures" of 
"originally intuited life" must be repeatedly taken up and given new life 
(OG, p. 165). This is the task of the phenomenological philosopher working 
within the context of the epoche. Language is being pushed here "beyond" 
the limiting horizon of the world, beyond second-order, sedimented, 
purely "functional" language into the "life-world," the lived-world, the pre-
reflective world of inter-subjective self-consciousness. 
In The Crisis Husserl does not call the reader to the stark 
methodological manipulation of the "object" that is found in the 
ruminations of Ideas I, but to a radically personal "self-transformation." 
We are not merely "called" to a new way of seeing, to a certain 
"perception" of a new region of "being," but to a new "way of being." This 
ethical demand emerges from Husserl's new pluralistic understanding of 
the transcendental ego. The term "ego" is really a misnomer here. This 
"ego", this individual "I," is already a plurality, already a "we", a community 
involved in a pre-given 'life-world." 
In The Crisis we are called to a new way of life. For philosophers, this 
way of life is understood in terms of the whole of mankind. Philosophers 
are called to be mankind's most essential self-reflection (C, Appdx IV, pp. 
335-41). The primary philosophical concern will no longer be the "what" of 
the metaphysical question, but the "how" of it. The humanistic motivation 
of the epoche takes precedence here over the already resolved technical 
problems. What is essential is that we practice the epoche and live it "as a 
habitual attitude which we resolve to take up once and for all" (C, III A, 40, 
p. 150) over and over again. At one point in The Crisis, Husserl goes so far 
as to describe the initial recognition and acceptance of this "call" to take 
up the epoche as comparable to a religious experience! "Perhaps it will 
become manifest," Husserl says, 
Edmund Husserl, "The Origin of Geometry," in Jacques Derrida, Edmund 
Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, trans. John P. Leavcy, Jr. 
(1939; New York: Nicholas Hyas, Ltd., 1978), pp. 157-180; hereafter'OC. 
8 Cf. my paper, "An Organism of Words: Ruminations on the 
Philosophical-Poetics of Merleau-Ponty," Kinesis, 14, no. 1(1984): 13-33. 
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that the total phenomenological attitude and the epoche belonging to 
it are destined in essence to effect, at first, a complete personal 
transformation, comparable in the beginning to a religious 
conversion, which then, however, over and above this, bears within 
itself the significance of the greatest existential transformation which 
is engaged as a task to mankind as such (C, III A, 35, p. 137). 
What does it really mean that the full, "universal" epoche is 
"comparable" in the beginning to a "religious conversion?" We must read 
this keeping in mind that Husserl has explicitly warned against 
misinterpreting transcendental phenomenology as any kind of mystical or 
supermundane "transcendentalism," while at the same time recalling that 
he does not for a moment deny that phenomenology, as a philosophical 
way of life, is a thoroughly spiritual process with a "spiritual heritage" and a 
"spiritual unity" in which it is the task of the individual philosopher "to 
carry forward...the self-reflection of his forebears...the chain of thinkers, 
the social interrelation of their thinking, the community of their thought, 
and transform it into a living present for us..." (C, II, 15, p. 47). The epoche 
has now taken on the monumental proportions of world-transformation. 
By the time of The Crisis, the concept of the transcendental has come 
to include all self-conscious beings, even, Husserl suggests, animals, 
plants, and "all living beings insofar as they have, even indirectly but still 
verifiably, something like 'life,' and even communal life in the spiritual 
(geistige) sense" (C, III A, 55, p. 188). This primordial communion has a 
collectively pre-given world-horizon within which "objects" are experienced 
in their immanent, intentional givenness, i.e., intuitively, as "objects." 
Husserl is clearly less interested here in the ontological status of these 
"objects," whether or to what extent they are "real" — the "scientific" point 
of departure of the "Cartesian" reduction — and more interested in the 
lived experience of the existential subject, the experience that is more 
primary than the superficial activity of consciousness in the natural 
attitude. Here, "through the epoche a new way of experiencing, of 
thinking, of theorizing, is opened up" in which the philosopher "forbids 
himself to ask questions which rest upon the ground of the world at hand, 
questions of being, questions of value, practical questions, questions about 
being or not-being, about being valuable, being useful, being beautiful, 
being good, etc." (C, III A, 41, p. 152). Asking "about" is always an asking 
from within the horizon of the world. But what Husserl is interested in here 
is the "pure" subject as constituting, transcendental intentionality which, 
through the epoche, has achieved the "perspective" of a groundless 
"above" and "beyond" the world where "all natural interests are put out of 
play" (C,1II A, 41, p. 152). 
In Section 47 of The Crisis Husserl describes how the attitude 
achieved by the reduction is not an isolated one, and hence is defensible 
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against the charge of solipsism (initially worked out in Cartesian 
Meditations). Husserl argues that "in our continuously flowing world-
perceiving we are not isolated but rather have within it, contact with other 
human beings land) in living with one another each one can take part in 
the life of the others" (C, III A, 47, p. 163). This fundamentally communal 
nature of the transcendental "ego" is, if not a "new" development, certainly 
an advancement over the earlier formulation found in the fifth of the 
Cartesian Meditations. Where the horizontal/vertical approach to the 
transcendental in The Crisis is preeminently personal, intersubjective, 
world-oriented and historical, the earlier Cartesian approach is skewed 
toward the positivistically analytic and the "scientific" and thus results in 
an isolated, "empty" transcendental ego that is purely vertical, and thus 
lacks the horizontal transcendence toward the "other" which emerges in 
the epoche of The Crisis. The Cartesian epoche is, according to Husserl's 
own assessment, phenomcnologically inadequate (C, III A, 43, p. 155). 
In The Crisis the transformation of the whole person through 
practicing the epoche becomes a "vocation," a "habit," a way of life, 
something which must be lived every day as an ongoing, intersubjective 
self-transformation. If Ideas I laid out the bare possibility (theoria) of the 
epoche as method and goal, The Crisis depicts the reality of this earlier, 
more abstract epoche as actually being accomplished in terms of lived 
and living praxis. This is "the quite personal responsibility of our own true 
being as philosophers," Husserl says, "our inner personal vocation (which) 
bears within itself at the same time the responsibility for the true being of 
mankind." Philosophers are thus "functionaries of mankind." There is an 
inherently practical orientation to phenomenology, an ethical dimension. 
This involves, not the mere reflection upon, but the practice of the epoche. 
Husserl claims that "together with the new task (of phenomenology) and 
its universal apodictic ground, the practical possibility of a new philosophy 
will prove itself: through its execution" (C, I, 7, pp. 17-18). The radicality of 
this dimension of praxis is that it is a process whose uniqueness rests in its 
being the ground of its own being: 
In the epoche neither logic nor any a priori nor any philosophical 
demonstration in the venerable old style can provide us with artillery. 
Rather, like all objective-scientific disciplines, they are naive and are 
themselves to be subjected to the epoche. On the other hand, what is 
peculiarly proper to the essence of the incipient philosophy of this 
phenomenological-transccndental radicalism is that, as we have said 
before, rather than having a ground of things taken for granted and 
ready in advance, as does objective philosophy, it excludes in 
principle a ground of this or any other sort. Thus it must begin without 
any underlying ground. Out immediately it achieves the possibility of 
creating a ground for itself through its own powers, namely, in 
mastering, through original self-reflection, the naive world as 
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transformed into a phenomenon or rather a universe of phenomena. 
(C, III A,53,p.181) 
This is why, as Richard Cobb-Stevens points out, "the auto-constitution of 
the ego cannot be thematically displayed but only obliquely disclosed."9 
Thus in his new version of the epoche Husserl says that he will "lead" but 
not "instruct" us (C, I, 7, 18). In response to our personal/transcendental 
"call," we must take up and practice the epoche. 
The core responsibility of this "vocation" is found in the directive to 
abstain from the thesis of the common world. We must withdraw from all 
worldly interests and influences and become "disinterested spectators," 
participant-observers looking on at our own looking-on (C, III A, 41, p. 151). 
But at the same time we must not forget that we are also immersed in a 
pre-given life-world. 'Thus in a certain sense the philosopher within the 
epoche must also 'naturally live through' the natural life; yet the epoche 
effects an immense difference in that it changes the entire manner of 
investigation and, furthermore, reshapes the goal of knowledge in the 
whole of its ontic meaning" (C, III A, 52, p. 176). 
Although he characterizes the achievement of the full reduction as a 
"position above" the finite manifestations of the transcendental, Husserl 
nevertheless admits that there are problems of language here which may 
result in one's being misled: "to be sure, words taken from the sphere of 
the natural world . . . are dangerous, and the necessary transformation of 
their sense must therefore be noticed" (C, III A, 51, p. 174). This necessary 
transformation of sense "elevates" these spatio/temporal "signs" to the 
transcendental sphere where there is no space and a radically different 
notion of time. 
The epoche as it is re-formulated in The Crisis contains Husserl's 
answer to the problem, not only between philosophy and science, but to 
the larger "spiritual" crisis of the Western world as a collectively 
constituted phenomenon. World transformation is called for here through 
individual self-transformation, accomplished through the practice of the 
epoche. The constitutive operation of the transcendental "ego" in The 
Crisis involves the orchestration of a spiritual community which, through 
the practice of the epoche, achieves the mature development of ontic 
validity in self-evident experience and now begins taking "responsibility" 
for itself and all others in the world. 
Richard Cobb-Stevens, "Transcendental and Empirical Dimensions in 
Husserl's Phenomenology," in Continental Philosophy in America, ed. 
Hugh J. Silverman, et al. (Pittsburgh: Duqucsnc Univ. Press, 1983), p. 31. 
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5. The 'Reduction from Psychology' 
The themes of the reduction from the "Lebenswelt" are continued in 
Husserl's inductive consideration of the possibility of establishing the 
principles of transcendental phenomenology from the work proper to 
psychology, the work that deals with the possibilities of soul. Husserl 
asserts that "what is essentially proper to the soul includes all 
intcntionalitics, the experiences of the type called 'perception,' for 
example, considered precisely as those performed by the person serving 
as an example and exactly in the way he accomplishes them; and always 
{one must take carcl that nothing is brought in which goes beyond the 
person's or the 'soul's' own essence" (C, III B, 69, p. 236). It is the "soul" 
itself that is the "object" of correlation here and the manner in which 
experience is given to this soul. Epistemological concern for the 
ontological status of the "objective" world has been superceded by a 
concern for the manner in which the individual experiences that world. 
Thus, for Husserl, "whether the perceived (object] exists or not, whether the 
perceiving person is mistaken about this or not, and also whether I, the 
psychologist, who in my cmpathctic understanding of the person 
unhesitatingly concur in the belief in the perceived (object), am mistaken 
about it or not - this must remain irrelevant for me as a psychologist" (C, 
III B. 69, p. 236). These things must not interfere with the pure 
psychological description of the perception. What is of central 
importance here is the existing individual. "For psychology is, after all, 
supposed to be the universal science of souls, the parallel to the universal 
science of bodies; and just as the latter is from the start a science through a 
universal 'epoche through a habitual, vocational attitude established in 
advance in order to investigate abstractively only the corporeal in its own 
essential interrelations, so also for psychology" (C, 111 B, 69, p. 239). 
Husserl's formulation of the reduction from psychology in The Crisis 
offers a specific picture of the kind of radical self-transformation required 
by the "full" epoche. First of all, Husserl says, "the epoche must be 
actually universally carried out." It must not be merely a shallow, critical 
epoche, or "a universal critique of experience" offering the possibility of 
knowing "truths-in-themselves," or a "skeptical, agnostic epoche. The full 
epoche will be none of these. These false epoches all succumb to the 
omnipresent temptation of the natural attitude; they are "positional" 
assertions, Husserl argues. "But the psychologist as such in his inquiry 
must, we repeat, take and have no position." And, we might add, the same 
is true for the phenomenological philosopher. It is only through this 
prejudice-free, transcendental "posture" that the psychologist will achieve 
full intentional unity, full realization of the "absolutely self-enclosed 
'internal' world of ...(conscious) subjects," that is, for the phenomenological 
psychologist, the "total unity of the intentional life as his horizon of work" 
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(C, III B, 69, p. 240). A "therapeutic" dimension of the epoche is revealed 
here. The achievement of the attitude of the 'disinterested spectator' 
("disinterest" as a non-positional "position" requires further analysis) is 
both the prerequisite and the goal of the process. Both the psychologist 
and the subject, as co-habitants of a single, created world, already co-
penetrate the transcendental realm, in a manner that reflects the relation 
between the "sub-community" of philosophers in its relationship to 
"mankind" as mankind's self-reflection. 
6. Conclusion 
A key difference between the "earlier" and "later" reductions is that 
the later formulation of the epoche is established out of the context of a 
pre-given world-horizon, a horizon within which particular experiences 
arise and to which they are inextricably bound in terms of the logic of 
possibility of the object and the unity of the "inner" and "outer" horizon of 
the thing. This is "the lived world" in which we are always already 
immersed and which always exceeds our ability to comprehend or fully 
express it, as in Cestalt psychology where the whole exceeds the sum of its 
parts. Here the transcendental is revealed primarily as "lived" experience. 
The "Cartesian" reduction, on the contrary, attends to the object in terms 
of the continuous and harmonious correlation of a possible world of 
objects; but this world is generated from the structure of the object rather 
than from the pre-thematic "being there" in the world of the subject. 
This confirms the general difference in tone between these two 
approaches to the reduction: where the "Cartesian" reduction is abstract 
and technical, the reduction from the lebenswelt is personal, communal, 
and bound to the spiritual, ethical, social, political, and psychological 
dimensions of life. It is because the "Cartesian" reduction lacks an 
experiential ground in the lived-world that Husserl came to see it as 
"empty" and as thus contributing to the slippage of the investigating, 
phenomenological consciousness back into the worldly mire of the natural 
attitude, a slippage or derailment which requires that the phcnonenologist 
consciously work to get back on the track of the epoche, to begin anew, to 
initiate a fresh introduction to that process of phenomenological 
philosophy which is itself, in the beginning and the end, always a "science" 
of introductions. As Mcrlcau-Ponty realized, the final lesson of the epoche 
is that no final lesson is possible. Despite the differences between earlier 
and later forms of the reduction in Husserl's philosophy, despite the fact 
that the epoche is inconceivable as such, that it presents a perpetual 
challenge to the claim to supremacy of representational thinking...despite 
this it should be clear that the epoche is, and always was, for Husserl, an 
indispensable aspect of the practice of the phenomenological method 
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and, in its fulness, the guarantor of this method's end: apodicticity as an 
ethical way of life. 
